This paper studies government spending shocks under alternative …nancing regimes in the presence of non-competitive labour markets.
Introduction
This paper studies …scal policy in the presence of non-competitive labour markets. In order to address the question we extend the standard open-economy New Keynesian (NK) business cycle model in two dimensions: a detailed formulation of …scal policy and labour market matching frictions along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (MP). We consider a small monetary union member state following Galí and Monacelli (2005) . 1 We show that the detailed modelling of labour markets allows to identify …scal policy transmission channels not captured by the standard NK models. The link between …scal policy and the labour market is provided by distortionary labour taxes which directly in ‡u-ence the behavior of …rms and workers on the matching market. On the other hand, labour market outcomes a¤ect the budgetary stance through tax revenue and unemployment bene…t expenditure.
Fiscal policy is back at the centre of the policy debate. At the same time, there is uncertainty both in the empirical and theoretical literature on what the e¤ects of …scal policy really are. The positive e¤ect of increased government spending on output is widely acknowledged. But the magnitude of the output multiplier as well as e¤ects on especially private consumption and the real wage are still debated. Private consumption, as the largest component of aggregate demand, is a key determinant of the size of the government spending multiplier.
The …rst generation of modern macroeconomic models focusing on real business cycles predicted that increased government spending would just crowd out private consumption 2 . In the New Keynesian model, the negative e¤ect on private consumption is typically smaller because, when prices are rigid, …rms increase labour demand as they respond to increased aggregate demand (see e.g. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) ). The NK model in its standard form still predicts a negative response of private consumption to government spending shocks. The responses of employment and the real wage to …scal shocks have received much less attention than e¤ects on output and private consumption. In the RBC model, the increase in hours worked brought about by the negative wealth e¤ect implied a lower marginal productivity of labour and a fall in real wages. In contrast, in the NK framework, the increase in labour demand together with the increase in labour supply can drive up the real wage or at least make it fall by a smaller amount.
Recent literature suggests that, in addition to price rigidities, the economy should be modelled as "non-Ricardian"to account for important transmission channels of …scal policy. A "non-Ricardian" feature that has found to be important for the e¤ects of …scal policy, including the possibility of crowding-in consumption, is the inclusion of rule-of-thumb consumers who consume out of their current income (see e.g. Galí, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007)). Coenen and Straub (2005) , as well as Forni, Monteforte and Sessa (2009) have estimated the e¤ects of …scal policy in the Euro area with non-Ricardian consumers, and taking into account distortionary taxation. Distortionary taxation also breaks the Ricardian equivalence. With proportional tax rates, the path of taxation does matter, since the tax rate a¤ects the intratemporal optimality condition governing the consumer's leisure-consumption trade-o¤.
In this paper, special emphasis is put on how the public debt resulting from a spending increase is paid back. As Baxter and King (1993) initially pointed out for the RBC model, the decision on how spending is …nanced is a crucial determinant for the sign and magnitude of the response to a government spending shock. In view of this early …nding and compared to the large literature on the e¤ects of …scal stimulus, relatively little attention has been devoted to this question so far. We analyze the use of di¤erent tax rules to stabilize the debt. Both lump-sum and distortionary taxes are available to …nance spending. Our main contribution is to show that the assumption of the o¤setting …scal measure is critical for the e¤ects of …scal stimulus, due to their di¤erent e¤ects on the labour market. Bilbiie and Straub (2005) consider di¤erent …nancing schemes of government spending and emphasize the labour market's role in the propagation of …scal policy shocks but they use a Walrasian labour market. The advantage of the matching model is that it explicitly accounts for the extensive margin of labour utilisation (the number of persons employed) and involuntary unemployment. To our knowledge, although the role of labour markets for the transmission of …scal shocks has been recognised, the labour market matching model has not been used to identify these transmission channels in more detail. The REMS model for the Spanish economy does combine a labour market matching model and a range of tax instruments (see Boscá et al. (2007) ) but they do not include wage rigidity and government spending is …nanced by lump-sum taxes.
The results of our baseline model with lump-sum taxes used to …nance spending are in line with the majority of other New Keynesian models. Output increases, but the response of private consumption is negative. Most importantly, in our model, shifting the debt-stabilizing burden towards the distortionary labour tax has detrimental e¤ects on the labour market outcome and on general economic performance. The wage bargaining model included in the labour market matching model implies that as soon as the tax rule becomes operative the higher proportional tax rate is internalised in the negotiation process. The bargained nominal wage rises to compensate workers for the otherwise falling net income. The higher wage directly implies higher labour costs to …rms which decrease open vacancies and unemployment starts rising. The fall in employment drives the private consumption response being more negative than when public debt is adjusted through lump-sum taxes.
In a closed economy, the e¤ects of …scal shocks depend, in addition to the above mentioned features, on the endogenous response of monetary policy that determines the evolution of real interest rates. In the case of the small currency union member state, the sign and qualitative pattern of the economy's response to a change in government spending are less ambiguous because the nominal interest rate is …xed. Increased government spending at home raises output and the home price level, causing the real interest rate to fall. (see Galí and Monacelli (2005) ).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the model, Section 3 describes the parametrization and steady state of the model, Section 4 presents the simulation results and elaborates on the transmission mechanisms of …scal shocks, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
General features
The model considers a small monetary union member state and builds in this respect on Galí and Monacelli (2005) . As in Corsetti, Meier and Müller (2009), however, we allow for a fraction of liquidity constrained consumers and close the model by assuming a debtelastic interest rate. The home country is modelled along standard New-Keynesian practise comprising households, …rms and a public sector. For simplicity, capital is not included as a factor of production.
The framework is augmented by a Mortensen and Pissarides (MP) search and matching labour market model (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides 2000) . Integrating matching frictions and Nash wage bargaining into the NK framework has been shown to improve the performance of the macro model by generating less cyclical wages and more cyclical employment than the competitive market-clearing model, thus bringing it closer to the data (see e.g. Woodford 2003) .
For this paper, the structure of the standard labour market matching model has been amended with some key features that have, in more recent literature, been found useful in capturing the data and explaining the so-called unemployment volatility puzzle 3 . There is an emerging consensus that labour market frictions, wage rigidities and staggered price setting together are needed to explain movements in unemployment, and the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks (see e.g. Blanchard and Galí (2008) , Christo¤el et al. (2008) ). These features are taken to be important also for analyzing …scal policy.
The present model adds rigidity in the adjustment of wages in the form of staggered bargaining initially developed by Trigari (2006/2009) , and applied in Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) and Christo¤el, Kuester and Linzert (2008) . One advantage of this approach is that wage rigidity gets the explicit interpretation of longer wage contracts. Lengthening the duration of wage contracts makes wages in each period less responsive to economic conditions, and shifts adjustment to the labour quantity side.
In our framework, there is only one worker per …rm, and the wage and price setting decisions are separated from each other. Labour market frictions arise in the intermediate good sector. The wholesale …rms buy intermediate goods and re-sell them to the …nal goods sector. Wholesale …rms operate under monopolistic competition and set prices subject to Calvo rigidities. Final goods are produced from domestic and imported intermediate inputs under perfect competition.
The other extension of the model concerns the public sector. The government policy instruments include a lump-sum tax, a proportional wage tax rate paid by the employees, wage taxes paid by the employers in the form of social security contributions, unemployment ben- 3 Shimer (2005) argued that the MP model in its standard form does not su¢ ciently reproduce the relatively smooth behavior of wages and relatively volatile behavior of labor market variables observed in the data. Shimer argued that the problem arises because, in the standard model, the wage is renegotiated in every period by Nash bargaining and is thereby let to adjust very easily to changes in the economic environment. The volatility of wages absorbs a large part of the ‡uctuation that is actually observed in employment variables. In the growing body of literature that has attempted to explain the problem, also known as the unemployment volatility puzzle, the focus has accordingly been on ways to amplify the response of vacancies and unemployment to shocks. The range of alternative models proposed to solve the unemployment volatility puzzle include both ‡exible and rigid wage variants and have been summarized in e.g. Hall (2005) .
e…ts and other government transfers as well as a consumption tax. The tax instruments react to changes in the debt-to-output ratio according to simple …scal feedback rules. Government spending is subject to shocks.
Preferences
As in similar kinds of models, we adopt the representative or large household interpretation. This implies perfect consumption insurance, a key assumption needed to embed the MP model in a GE framework. Family members perfectly insure each other against variations in labour income due to their labour market status. This allows for the modelling of risk averse households and tackles the problem whereby households are identical but not all of their members are employed. As a result, the employment and unemployment rates are identical at the household level and across the population at large (see e.g. Merz (1995)).
It is assumed that a fraction 0 L 0 of the families does not have access to asset markets and thus consumes its current income. The rest of the families (a fraction 1 L of the total) own …rms, and may trade one-period bonds both domestically and internationally. These asset holding families will be indexed with a subscript 0A0. 
Asset Holders
Each asset-holding family maximizes its lifetime utility
where C A;t is …nal good consumption by the representative asset-holding consumer in period t, { 2 (0; 1) indicates an external habit motive, C A;t 1 stands for aggregate consumption of optimizing agents in the previous period, h t are hours worked, and is a scaling parameter of disutility of work, subject to the family budget constraint
Consumption P t C A;t is subject to a proportional tax c t . The portfolio of …nancial assets includes domestic and foreign nominal one-period bonds B A;t and B A;t . Domestic bonds are issued by the domestic government for which they represent debt. The interest rate paid or earned on foreign bonds by domestic households R t 1 p b t 1 consists of the common currency union interest rate which for the small member state is taken to be exogenous and a country-speci…c risk premium. The two …rst terms on the right hand side describe income in the form of either wage or unemployment bene…t. Income is also received as lump-sum transfers, in the form of repayment of last period's bond purchases and nominal pro…t from …rm ownership D t . n t are …xed costs of production which accrue to the owners of the …rms (see labour market section)
We leave aside for a moment the labour supply decision, which will be dealt with in the labour market subsection. The …rst order condition for domestic bond holdings is
which together with the marginal utility of consumption t = (C A;t {C A;t 1 ) % de…nes the intertemporal optimality condition for domestic consumption. R t = (1 + r n t ) is the gross nominal return on domestic bonds, and t+1 = P t+1 Pt is CPI in ‡ation. The discount factor is the same for all optimizing agents in the economy 5 and is de…ned throughout the paper as t;t+s = s t+s t . A similar Euler condition can be derived with respect to foreign bonds. As domestic and foreign bonds perfectly substitute each other, the arbitrage relation between them states that their nominal returns to the consumer have to be equal 6 , i.e.
where p (b t ) is a risk premium on foreign bond holdings, which follows the function
The risk premium is assumed to be increasing in the aggregate level of foreign real debt as a share of domestic output (b t = B t PtYt ) 7 . This should ensure the stability and determinacy of equilibrium in a small member state of the monetary union model 8 . In the steady state, the risk premium is assumed to be equal to one, and the domestic and foreign interest rates are the same. After loglinearization the arbitrage relation gets the form
Non-asset holders 5 since the asset-holding families are assumed to own the …rms. 6 This is a modi…ed uncovered interest parity condition where no risk is associated with exchange rate movements, as both domestic and foreign bonds are denominated in euros. 7 This is one of the mechanisms suggested by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) to close a small open economy model. Note that with the current notation a negative (positive) deviation of the stock of foreign bonds from the steady state zero level implies that the home country as a whole becomes a net borrower (lender), and faces a positive (negative) risk premium. 8 As Galí and Monacelli (2005) point out, along with accession to the monetary union the small member state no longer meets the Taylor principle since variations in its in ‡ation that result from idiosyncratic shocks will have an in…nitesimal e¤ect on union-wide in ‡ation, and will thus induce little or no response from the union's central bank. According to the Taylor principle, in order to guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium, the central bank has to adjust the nominal interest rates more than one-for-one with changes in in ‡ation (see e.g. Woodford (2003)) Non-asset holders do not optimize. Their consumption in nominal terms will just equal their current income in every period and they are therefore referred to as rule-of-thumb or hand-to-mouth consumers.
Aggregate consumption
Aggregate consumption is given by a weighted average of the corresponding variables for each consumer type
The labour market
The labour market brings together workers and intermediate good …rms. It was assumed that the capacity to participate in asset markets is the only di¤erence between the two kinds of households. Therefore, both asset-holding and rule-of-thumb consumers supply an identical labour input, and the decisions of workers can be characterised from the point of view of a representative worker.
Unemployment, vacancies and matching
The measure of successful matches m t is given by the matching function
where u t and v t are the aggregate measures of unemployed workers and vacancies. m t is the ‡ow of matches during a period t, and u t and v t are the stocks at the beginning of the period. The matching function is, as usual, increasing in both vacancies and unemployment, concave, and homogeneous of degree one (see e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). The Cobb-Douglas form implies that is the elasticity of matching with respect to the stock of unemployed people, and m represents the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The probabilities that a vacancy will be …lled and that the unemployed person …nds a job are respectively
9 Non-Ricardian households have been modelled in various ways in the literature. Some authors have assumed that they can hold money balances (e.g. Coenen et al. (2007) ) and / or optimize intratemporally. Here they simply obey a rule to consume all of their current income. We are currently exploring the modelling of the intratemporal optimization problem of non-asset holders. This would have implications for the labour market matching model too, as the marginal utility term in the workers'surplus equation would di¤er across di¤erent types of consumers. and the inverse of these probabilities is the mean duration of vacancies and unemployment respectively.
is labour market tightness. The tighter the labour market is, or the less there are unemployed people relative to the number of open vacancies (i.e. larger t ), the smaller the probability that the …rm succeeds in …lling the vacancy and the larger the probability that the unemployed person …nds a job. In contrast, a decrease in the number of vacancies relative to unemployment (smaller t ) implies that the unemployed person has a smaller probability to …nd a job.
In the beginning of each period, a fraction of matches will be terminated with an exogenous probability t 2 (0; 1). The separation rate evolves as 10 log( t ) = (1 ) log ( ) + log t 1 + t , where
Labour market participation can be characterised as follows. The size of the labour force is normalised to one. The number of employed workers at the beginning of each period is
where the …rst term on the right hand side represents those workers who were employed already in the previous period and whose jobs have survived beginning-of-period job destruction, and the second term covers those workers who got matched in the previous period and become productive in the current period. After the exogenous separation shock, the separated workers return to the pool of unemployed workers and start immediately searching for a job. The number of unemployed is u t = 1 n t respectively. Job creation takes place when a worker and a …rm meet and agree to form a match at a negotiated wage. The wage that the …rm and the worker choose must be high enough that the worker wants to work in the job, and low enough that the employer wants to hire the worker. These requirements de…ne a range of wages that are acceptable to both the …rm and the worker. They do not, however, uniquely determine the equilibrium wage.
In the steady state an equal amount of jobs are created and destructed:
Wage bargaining
As in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model, it is assumed that match surplus, the sum of the worker and …rm surpluses is shared according to e¢ cient Nash bargaining. In the e¢ cient bargaining framework, wages and hours are negotiated simultaneously. The …rm and the worker choose the wage and the hours of work to maximize the weighted product of their net return from the match.
The structure of the staggered multiperiod contracting model follows Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) . For comparison, the period-by-period bargaining outcome is presented in the appendix. The idea of staggered wage bargaining is analogous to Calvo price setting. Rigidity is created by assuming that a fraction of …rms are not allowed to renegotiate their wage in a given period. As a result, all workers in those …rms receive the wage paid the previous period w t 1 partially indexed to in ‡ation. The constant probability that …rms are allowed to renegotiate the wage is labeled 1
. Accordingly,
is the average duration of a wage contract. Thus, the combination of wage bargaining and Calvo price setting allows to give an intuitive interpretation to the source of wage rigidity instead of more of less ad hoc formulations in standard NK models. Period-by-period bargaining corresponds to the special case of = 0.
In each period, …rms that are allowed to renegotiate their wage do it in the Nash bargaining set up. It is assumed that, as they become productive, new matches enter the same Calvo scheme for wage-setting than existing matches. Gertler and Trigari (2009) argue that after controlling for compositional e¤ects there are no di¤erences in the ‡exibility of new and existing worker's wages 11 . The contract wage w t is chosen to solve:
, with probability w t+1 , with probability 1 where H t (r) and J t (r) are the worker and …rm surpluses respectively, and 0 1 is the relative measure of workers'bargaining strength. The assumption of partial indexation of the past nominal wage to CPI in ‡ation t = Workers The value to the worker of being employed consists of after-tax labour income, the disutility from working, and the expected present value of his situation in the next period.
The value to the worker of being unemployed is 11 E.g. Pissarides (2007) and Haefke et al (2008) argue the opposite: that wages of newly hired workers are volatile unlike wages for ongoing job relationships. This would mean that there is wage rigidity, but not of the kind that leads to more volatility in unemployment ‡uctuations.
where the …rst term on the RHS is the value of the outside option to the worker, i.e. the unemployment bene…t b, and the second term gives the expected present value of either working or being unemployed. Note that unemployed workers do not need to take into account the probability of job destruction even if they get matched because of the timing assumption. A match that has not yet become productive cannot be destroyed. Combining these value equations gives the expression for worker surplus
where the last term is the value for the worker to move from unemployment to employment.
Matching is a random process, i.e. there is no directed search in the labour market. New matches are subject to the same bargaining scheme as existing matches, and therefore the new worker does not have a priori knowledge of what the wage will be. He therefore values it according to its expected average value E t H x;t+1 .
Intermediate …rms For the …rm, the value of an occupied job is equal to the pro…t of the …rm in the current period net of payroll taxes s t , and the expected future value of the job.
where x t is the relative price of the intermediate sector's good, and f (h t ) = z t h t is match output. The marginal product of labour is accordingly
. In addition to labour costs, the …rm faces a per-period …xed cost of production which is independent of hours worked and de…ned in real terms. At the economy's level, …xed costs are proportional to the number of employed workers. Labour-augmenting productivity z t is identical for all matches and follows
The value to the …rm of an open vacancy is
The value of a vacancy consists of an exogenous hiring cost t , and of the expected value from future matches. In equilibrium, all pro…t opportunities from new jobs are exploited so that the equilibrium condition for the supply of vacant jobs is V t = 0. With each …rm having only one job, pro…t maximization is equivalent to this zero-pro…t condition for …rm entry. Setting the equation for V t as zero in every period gives:
This vacancy posting condition equates the marginal cost of adding a worker (real cost times mean duration of vacancy) to the discounted marginal bene…t from a new worker. After taking into account the free entry condition, the …rm surplus reduces to J t . Total real pro…ts of the intermediate sector …rms which are paid to their owners i.e. Ricardian consumers are
Multiperiod bargaining set up Unlike with period-to-period bargaining, in the presence of staggered contracting, …rms and workers have to take into account the impact of the contract wage on the expected future path of …rm and worker surplus. Accordingly, the …rst order condition for wage-setting is given by:
factors would be equal across agents unless distortionary taxes were breaking this symmetry. With staggered bargaining, labour taxes enter the discounting factor equations of the agents implying that workers and …rms also take into account the future path of taxation in their negotiating behaviour 12 . In the limiting case of e¢ cient bargaining, = 0, the partial derivatives of the surpluses w.r.t. the wage reduce to t = h t (1 t ), and t = h t (1 + s t ), and the …rst order condition accordingly reduces to its period-by-period counterpart (1 t ) J t = (1 ) (1 + s t ) H t . Given that the probability of wage adjustment is i.i.d., and all matches at renegotiating …rms end up with the same wage w t , the evolution of the average hourly wage in the economy can be expressed as a convex combination of the contract wage and the average wage across the matches that do not renegotiate, after taking into account the indexation scheme.
Wage dynamics The staggered bargaining framework has implications on the behavior of workers and …rms. To describe wage dynamics in the presence of staggered contracting, we will develop loglinear expressions for the relevant wage equations in the same way as in Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) . The contract wage is solved by …rst linearizing the …rst order condition
and then plugging into the FOC the value equations and discounting factors for the worker and the …rm respectively in their loglinearized form
(1 )
and
(1 ) 1
The resulting contract wage is (see Appendix for details)
where = (1 ) . This is the optimal wage set at time t by all matches that are allowed to renegotiate their wage. As is usual with Calvo contracting, it depends on a wage target w 0 t (r) and next period's optimal wage. As the probability of not being able to renegotiate the wage approaches zero ! 0, ! 0, and the contract wage w t ! w t , approaches the period-by-period Nash wage. Gertler and Trigari (2006) show that compared to usual Calvo contracting, when the optimal wage is set as a result of a wage bargain, there are additional spillover e¤ects on the target wage. The spillover e¤ect of the wage bargain on the target wage arises because when wage contracts extend over multiple periods, the worker's outside option depends also on the wage he or she can expect to earn elsewhere. The target wage equation can be written as
where b w 0 t (r) is the target wage the …rm and its worker would agree to if they are allowed to renegotiate and if …rms and workers elsewhere remain on staggered multiperiod wage contracts, a sum of the wage that would arise if all matches were negotiating wages periodby-period b w 0 t and the spillover e¤ect 13 . The spillover-free component of the target wage is of the same form than the period-byperiod negotiated wage, adjusted for the multiperiod discounting factors.
is positive indicating that when the expected average market wage E t b w t+1 is higher than the expected contract wage E t b w t+1 (i.e. unusually good labour market conditions) this raises the target wage in the negotiations. Unlike in the more standard monopolistic labour market modelling of New Keynesian DSGEs, here the spillover e¤ect is responsible for a part of the added rigidity in wages Thus, the wage inertia and resulting employment dynamics are not only a product of staggered multiperiod wage contracting, but also of the spillover e¤ects from the Nash bargaining process.
Finally, combining all the relevant elements of the wage bargaining outcome yields the second-order di¤erence equation for the evolution of the average wage (see Appendix)
Due to staggered contracting, b w t depends on the lagged wage b w t 1 , the spillover-free target wage b w 0 t , and the expected future wage E t b w t+1 .
Determining hours of work
While matches are restrained to renegotiate the wage only with a given exogenous probability, hours per worker can be renegotiated at each point in time. With e¢ cient Nash bargaining, optimal hours of work can be found from the following …rst order condition obtained by di¤erentiating the Nash maximand w.r.t hours
where f h;t is, as before, the marginal product of the labour input i.e. hours, and which, using the expressions for the production and utility functions, can be written as
This optimality condition equates the value of marginal product to the marginal rate of substitution between work and leisure, and is thus of the same form as in a competitive labour market. At the margin, the hourly wage is such that the marginal cost to the worker from working is equal to the marginal gain to the …rm but neither of these needs to be equal to the wage. Distortionary taxes drive an additional wedge between these two. The individual labour input of a worker is determined irrespective of the wage. But the model also allows for labour adjustment in the number of workers as de…ned by the vacancy posting condition and matching function. The matching model's property that output can be changed by changing either the number of hours worked in each match h t (the intensive margin) or the number of employed workers n t (the extensive margin) is an important di¤erence from the competitive model or most of the standard NK models.
Final good …rms
There are two types of …nal goods …rms. One is producing private consumption goods and the other type of …nal goods …rm produces public consumption goods 14 . 
Private consumption good
where $ measures the trade price elasticity, or elasticity of substitution between domestically produced intermediate goods and imported intermediate goods in the production of …nal goods for given relative prices, and W is the weight of imports in the production of …nal consumption goods.The parameter " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated intermediate goods produced and distributed within a country
The optimization problem determining the allocation of expenditure between the individual varieties of domestic and foreign intermediate goods yields the following demand curves facing each wholesale …rm
where P H;t and P F;t are the aggregate price indexes for the domestic and foreign intermediate goods respectively
To determine the optimal allocation between the domestic and imported intermediate goods, the …nal good …rm minimizes costs P H;t Y H;t +P F;t Y F;t subject to its production function or aggregation constraint. This yields the demands for the domestic and foreign intermediate good bundles by domestic …nal good producers
where P t is the home country's aggregate price index, or consumption price index
At the level of individual intermediate goods the law of one price holds 15 . That, together with the assumption that the weight of the home country good in the foreign consumer price index is in…nitesimally small, implies that P F;t is equal to the foreign CPI P t (see Galí-Monacelli (2005) ).
Public consumption good
The public consumption good is composed of only domestic intermediate goods g t (i). This assumption implies, contrary to e.g. the Redux model, full home bias in government spending. This simplifying assumption can be supported by the observation from input-output tables that the use of foreign intermediate goods in government spending is signi…cantly lower than in private consumption.
Each wholesale …rm i selling intermediate goods to the public consumption good producer faces the following demand schedule
Wholesale …rms and price setting
The wholesale …rms buy the homogeneous intermediate goods at nominal price p H;t x t per unit and transform them one-to-one into the di¤erentiated product. The separation of the price setting decision from the wage setting decision is done to maintain the tractability of the model. Price rigidities arise at the wholesale level while search frictions and wage rigidity only directly a¤ect the intermediate goods sector. This is a usual assumption in the models that extend the New Keynesian framework with Mortensen-Pissarides type labour markets (see e.g. Trigari (2006)) 16 . There is Calvo-type stickiness in price-setting and the relative price of intermediate goods x t coincides with the real marginal cost faced by wholesale …rms. In each period, the wholesale …rm can adjust its price with a constant probability 1 which implies that prices are …xed on average for 1 1 periods. The wholesale …rm's optimization problem is to maximize expected future discounted pro…ts by choosing the sales price p H;t (i), taking into account the pricing frictions and the demand curve they face. It is assumed that the wholesale …rm sells the home-country intermediate goods for the same price for domestic and foreign …nal goods producers, and for the domestic government.
The …rst order condition for the pricing decision of a wholesale …rm that reoptimizes at t is
where y t (i) is the demand of …rm i's product by domestic private consumption good …rms, foreign private consumption good …rms and the domestic government as outlined in the previous section
where Y D t stands for total demand for domestic intermediate goods. All wholesale …rms are identical except that they may have set their current price at di¤erent dates in the past. However, in period t, if they are allowed to reoptimize their price, they all face the same decision problem and choose the same optimal price p H;t . Using the de…nition of the discount factor and rearranging, the FOC can be rewritten as = is the ‡exible-price markup. This is the standard Calvo result. In the absence of price rigidity, the optimal price would reduce to a constant markup over marginal costs. Log-linearizing the FOC around the steady state yields the New Keynesian Phillips Curve where domestic in ‡ation depends on marginal costs and expected future in ‡ation
where =
(1 ) (1 ) . Total real pro…ts of the wholesale sector …rms are
Fiscal policies
The public sector's role in this economy is to collect taxes and use them to …nance unemployment bene…ts and lump-sum transfers as well as government spending G t . The various tax instruments in use are the labour tax on workers t , payroll taxes on …rms s t , and a consumption tax c t . Lump-sum transfers T R t may also be altered in response to changes in spending. The government also earns income through new debt issues in bonds which are repaid in the next period. The government budget constraint is n t w t h t ( t + s t ) + c t P t C t + B t = P H;t G t + P t bu t + T R t + R t 1 B t 1 (50) Accordingly, the government real debt b t =
Bt Pt
, evolves as
Fiscal policy is assumed to obey a rule whereby the chosen …scal variable is adjusted to changes in debt as a fraction of steady state output. On the revenue side, we consider four alternative tax instruments: the lump-sum tax, consumption tax and the labour taxes on the employer and the employee. The rules relate the change in the policy instrument from its steady state level to the deviation of real debt from its target level
where T AX t = LS t ; c t ; t ; s t and d is the sensitivity of the tax instrument with respect to the government debt-to-output ratio. Government spending is characterised by the following autoregressive process 
Following Galí and Monacelli (2005) de…ning an index for aggregate domestic demand
allows us to rewrite this as
Aggregate domestic demand has to equal aggregate supply minus the resources lost to vacancy posting, leading to the home economy's aggregate resource constraint
While the above equation states that in equilibrium domestic output has to equal its usage as consumption, exports and government spending, market-clearing in the intermediate good sector also requires
The net foreign asset position is determined by the trade balance -the di¤erence between domestic output and domestic consumption.
This relation is obtained by combining the consumers' budget constraint, the following aggregations, the government's budget constraint and the economy's aggregate resource constraint. Since only Ricardian consumers hold …nancial assets, the equilibrium equations for aggregate holdings of domestic and foreign bonds are
Similarly, only members of asset-holding families receive dividends from domestic …rms
where total dividends accrued to households are the sum of the pro…ts in the intermediate and wholesale sectors The quarterly discount factor is = 0:992 which corresponds to an annual interest rate of 3; 3%. The labour supply, or Frish elasticity ( 1 ), is set to 0:2. This is in the middle range of values implied by most microeconomic studies which estimate this elasticity to be between 0 and 0.5 (see Card (1994)) for a survey). Much higher elasticities have been generally used in the business cycle literature because macro elasticities account also for the variation in the employment rate 17 . The quarterly separation rate is calibrated at = 0:04. The labour elasticity of production parameter is set to = 0:66 which implies decreasing returns to scale in the intermediate goods production sector, and a labour share of 60 percent. The unemployment bene…t parameter is calibrated at b = 0:42 but generates a too high net replacement rate of 78 percent, de…ned as the ratio of net unemployment bene…ts to average net (after-tax) income from work b wtht (1 ) . According to OECD's "Bene…ts and Wages" publication, the average net replacement rate over 60 months of unemployment for Finland is 70 percent averaging over four di¤erent family types. The unemployment bene…t is not assumed to be proportional to the wage nor to be indexed to in ‡ation. As Christo¤el et al. (2008) note, in labour market matching models, there is a trade-o¤ between obtaining a reasonable labour share and a plausible replacement rate. Further, Costain and Reiter (2008) show that a real business cycle model augmented with labour market matching can be made consistent with either business cycle facts or the e¤ects of labour market policies but not both. The assessment of the chosen parameters in the light of these considerations is left for future work.
The wholesale sector is calibrated in line with the literature so that the markup is at a conventional value of = " " 1 = 1:1. The Calvo parameter is = 0:75 on the basis of CKL calibration from the Eurosystem In ‡ation Persistence Network. The average duration of prices is accordingly 4 quarters. As to wages, they are assumed to be renegotiated every one and a half years, implying = 0:83.
The steady state values of the model variables implied by the current parameterization can be found in table 2. The steady state equations of the model are in turn provided in appendix A. In the steady state, output is normalized to one, so that GDP components can be interpreted as shares of GDP. The working force is also normalised to one so that the steady state unemployment level is 9 percent. A symmetric open economy steady state is assumed where consumption levels are initially the same at home and abroad and both the trade balance and net foreign asset holdings are zero. As no capital is included in the model, output components private consumption and government consumption (and the tiny amount of resources lost to vacancy posting) are scaled so that private consumption accounts for 71 percent of steady state output and government consumption is 28 percent.
The steady state tax rates for labour and consumption are computed as ten year historical averages of corresponding tax rates in Finland times the model-implied tax base for that tax category. Accordingly, labour taxes for the employee and the employer respectively amount to 30 percent and 25 percent times the wage bill and the consumption tax rate corresponds to an average of 19 percent times the size of private consumption. The government's steady state debt to GDP ratio is set at 45 percent. 
Model evaluation
In the following we analyze the transmission mechanism of …scal policy under our labour market speci…cation. Speci…cally, we assess the e¤ects of government spending shocks because these are in the centre of the debate on the e¤ects of …scal policy. Special emphasis is put on how the public debt resulting from a spending increase is paid back. After being identi…ed by Baxter and King (1993) as a crucial assumption for the e¤ects of …scal policy in an RBC model, the chosen …nancing scheme has more recently been recognised to shape the response to a government spending shock in a New Keynesian model as well (see Bilbiie and Straub (2004) ). Other crucial assumptions, as pointed out by Galí et al. (2007) are the share of liquidity constrained consumers, the extent of price rigidity, the persistence of the government spending shock and the intertemporal path of taxation (i.e. how strongly and quickly taxes react to debt and de…cit). The point on o¤setting …scal measures has recently been taken up by Corsetti, Meier and Müller (2009) who analyze a policy that reduces spending over time in response to an initial rise in public debt. They …nd that this spending reversal enhances the expansionary impact of increased public spending. We analyze in the present paper the use of di¤erent tax rules to stabilize the debt although the framework would also allow to consider spending reversals. Tax instruments are assessed in isolation in order to identify the mechanisms at work with each instrument -instead of a more realistic scenario where …scal policy consists of a combination of instruments -especially the interaction between labour market matching frictions and the chosen …scal policy approach.
In the following simulations, the positive government spending shock generates public debt which is gradually paid back following alternative …scal feedback rules. As a baseline, we analyze an increase in government spending corresponding to an approximately 1 percent increase in aggregate demand with distortionary labour taxes and the consumption tax kept constant. The resulting public debt is brought back to its steady state level by allowing lump-sum taxes to increase as commonly assumed in most other papers. Then, to reveal the speci…c properties of the present model, two other tax instruments are considered: the labour tax on employees and the consumption tax. The results for ‡exible wages and with no rule-of-thumb consumers are displayed in Figure 1 . The e¤ects of wage rigidity and ruleof-thumb consumers for the results are assessed separately below for the baseline …scal policy scenario.
The baseline response with a lump-sum tax rule
The baseline response to a positive government spending is qualitatively in line with that obtained from other New Keynesian models (see e.g. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) , and for the speci…c e¤ects on employment and the real wage Pappa (2009)). The rise in government demand has a positive e¤ect on output. Because of full home bias in government consumption, the multiplier is directly proportional to the share of government spending in GDP and the size of the shock. The e¤ect on private consumption is negative. The negative wealth e¤ect causes an initial drop in private consumption and increases hours worked per person but the response of consumption is reversed by the increase in employment (the number of workers times individual hours).
The initial increase in aggregate demand raises the expected returns of …rms from a …lled vacancy. As is usual with labour market matching frictions, vacancies increase on impact but employment only starts to rise (unemployment starts to fall) from the next period on as new matches become productive. The combined increase in both labour demand and supply drives up the negotiated wage. Although not shown in the picture, also the real wage rises contemporaneously together with employment in line with recent …ndings by Pappa (2009) .
The e¤ect of increased government spending on the trade balance and on the termsof-trade appear similar to what e.g. Kim and Roubini (2003) or Müller (2006) …nd. An increase in government spending appreciates the terms of trade and increases net exports. The terms of trade appreciation is natural in the presence of full home bias in government consumption: the export price index -which in this framework is the domestic price index (because of producer pricing) -rises relative to the foreign price index which is not a¤ected by …scal stimulus in the small member state. It should be noted that as the focus is on a small currency union member state there is no endogenous monetary policy response that would counteract the e¤ect of rising prices in the home country.
As to the trade balance, there are two counteracting forces. On the one hand, the trade balance improves because the value of trade increases, but on the other hand higher prices of home-produced goods have a negative e¤ect on the trade balance through the substitution channel. Here the former e¤ect dominates. The latter e¤ect tends to be larger the higher the home bias in private consumption and the higher the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the home and foreign good. 
Alternative …scal policy scenarios
The results show that shifting the debt-stabilizing burden towards the distortionary labour tax (dotted line) signi…cantly changes the picture. Most importantly, the wage bargaining framework included in the labour market matching model implies that as soon as the tax rule becomes operative the higher proportional tax rate is internalised in the negotiation process. The bargained nominal wage stays above its steady state level to compensate workers for the otherwise falling net income. The higher wage directly implies higher labour costs to …rms which decrease open vacancies and unemployment starts rising. The fall in employment drives the private consumption response being more negative than when public debt is adjusted through lump-sum taxes.
When consumption taxes are used to stabilize debt, the negative labour market reactions are absent although both tax increases imply a roughly equal initial revenue e¤ect. Output and vacancies rise as much as with the lumpsum rule and government debt returns more quickly to its steady state level. Even the consumption response is less negative than in the case of the labour tax rule although consumption is directly taxed.
The results lend support to the argument on the importance of how the increased public spending is …nanced. The alternative scenarios assessed above indicate that a more detailed description of the labour market may bring forward important transmission channels of …scal policy that have not received much attention in the existing literature.
We also investigated a similar government spending shock using the labour tax on the employer as the stabilizing instrument. The results are very similar than when using the …scal rule on the employee's labour tax. The only signi…cant di¤erence is that the negotiated wage does not rise in the same way leaving the worker's net income and the …rm's labour cost approximately the same across scenarios. As labour costs are however raised directly by the tax on employers, the labour market outcome is similar with falling employment and rising unemployment. The simulations are available on request.
Automatic stabilizers are at work in the present setup. The initial expansion of output and the accompanying improvement in employment after a government spending shock increase the government's labour tax revenues and decreases expenditure on unemployment bene…ts. However, consumption tax revenue falls as private consumption decreases and government debt increases signi…cantly and persistently. Indeed, debt-stabilizing …scal rules are needed to help bringing debt back to its steady state level in a reasonable time frame. Because of the small initial size of lump-sum taxes in the government budget compared to government spending, the increase in taxes dictated by that rule is relatively ine¤ective in restraining indebtedness unless a higher debt-sensitivity coe¢ cient is assumed. The present rules are calibrated so that irrespective of the rule in force the initial …scal policy tightening implied by the rule is approximately equal in all cases. Figure 2 shows the results for the baseline model where lump-sum taxes react to public debt with wages being negotiated, instead of period-by-period, on average once every sixth quarter. Making the wage more rigid increases the magnitude of the responses of labour market variables. Vacancies react more strongly to the initial stimulus as …rms' expected pro…ts are larger when labour costs do not rise. The more favourable labour market reaction in the short-term contributes to consumption falling less than in the baseline. However, in the longer term, as the wage adjusts upward, vacancies and employment start to fall and unemployment rises as shown by the right tails of the corresponding impulse response functions. Output remains lower than its steady state level and consumption below for a long time.
Staggered wage bargaining
A recent contribution by Monacelli, Perotti and Trigari (2010) …nds that (real) wage rigidity dampens the e¤ect of government spending shocks on hiring, because although the total surplus from the match increases, the …rm's share of the surplus decreases discouraging hiring. One di¤erence in their framework is that they do not combine wage rigidity with price rigidity. The e¤ects of including rule-of-thumb consumers in the present framework are shown in Figure 3 . The assumption that one third of consumers cannot intertemporally optimize and just fully consume their current income, does create a strongly positive initial response of private consumption and increases signi…cantly the output multiplier. This pattern of stronger initial response is seen also for other variables of interest. This e¤ect is, however, short-lived because the o¤setting lumpsum tax increase quickly begins to decrease the perperiod income of rule of thumb consumers. It is assumed here that lumpsum taxes are levied on asset-holders and non-asset-holders at the same rate. Coenen and Straub (2005) found that the more the tax burden rests with Ricardian households the more government spending can crowd in private consumption. Also, the initial wage increase discourages the …rms from hiring and vacancies turn negative which causes unemployment to rise. Government debt initially falls because all components of tax revenue rise. 
The model with rule-of-thumb consumers

Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the e¤ects of …scal policy by analyzing government spending shocks under alternative …scal rules and rigid labour markets. For this purpose, we have introduced …scal policy and labour market matching frictions into an open-economy New Keynesian DSGE.
The link between …scal policy and the labour market was introduced with the help of distortionary labour taxes which directly in ‡uence the behavior of …rms and workers on the matching market. This approach provides a richer framework to analyse the e¤ects of …scal policy than in the existing literature e.g. by accounting for the extensive margin of labour adjustment and involuntary unemployment. Additional rigidity in wage determination was introduced with the help of Gertler and Trigari's staggered bargaining framework.
In our baseline model, the public debt resulting from increased government spending is paid back by allowing lump-sum taxes to increase. Results are in line with most existing New Keynesian literature. The government spending shock has an expansionary e¤ect on output and a small but negative e¤ect on private consumption. The latter is driven by the negative wealth e¤ect but counteracted by a positive employment response brought about by increasing real wages and increasing labour supply along both the intensive and extensive margin.
The results show that the assumption of the o¤setting …scal measure is critical for the e¤ects of …scal stimulus. Speci…cally, shifting the debt-stabilizing burden towards the distortionary labour tax makes the e¤ects signi…cantly more negative. Most importantly, the wage bargaining model included in the labour market matching model implies that as soon as the tax rule becomes operative the higher proportional tax rate is internalized in the wage negotiation process. The bargained nominal wage rises to compensate workers for the otherwise falling net income. The higher wage directly implies higher labour costs to …rms which decrease open vacancies and unemployment starts rising. The fall in employment implies a stronger contraction in private consumption compared with the more standard case of lump-sum tax adjustment.
Interestingly, the response of private consumption to …scal stimulus is not as negative if consumption taxes are used to consolidate the debt. This is because they do not add distortions to the labour market and they are a large revenue component.
While the precise quantitative e¤ects of our …scal policy simulations are still work in progress, the main conclusion is rather general. In an economy with labour market rigidities, withdrawing …scal stimulus by means of increased labour taxes has detrimental e¤ects on growth and employment dynamics.
Some sensitivity analysis was made with respect to the inclusion of rule of thumb consumers. Our initial results indicate, in line with recent literature, that the presence of rule of thumb consumers signi…cantly increases the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy. This feature of the model will be put more emphasis on in future work.
Similarly, while the main propositions of the Gertler and Trigari staggered bargaining framework were shown to hold also in the present setup, more e¤ort will be put on exploring the role of wage rigidity for shock propagation. The assessment of the e¤ects of a di¤erent wage bargaining regime will also be conducted as previous research indicates this could a¤ect the results. 
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A
.2 Model dynamics
The dynamics of the model are obtained by taking a log-linear approximation around a deterministic steady state.
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A.3 Period-by-period Nash bargaining
In the standard MP model, it is assumed that total match surplus, S t = (W t U t ) + (J t V t ), the sum of the worker and …rm surpluses is shared according to e¢ cient Nash bargaining where wages and hours are negotiated simultaneously. The …rm and the worker choose the wage and the hours of work to maximize the weighted product of the worker's and the …rm's net return from the match.
where 0 1 is the relative measure of workers'bargaining strength.
The worker surplus gets the following form.
and the …rm surplus is (after taking into account the free entry condition V t = 0)
The …rst-order condition for wage-setting is
which would, without taxes, correspond to the simple surplus splitting result where the total surplus from the match is shared according to the bargaining power parameter . The optimality condition for wage-setting can be rewritten as a wage equation that includes only contemporaneous variables by substituting the value equations into the Nash FOC, and making use of the expressions for the production and utility functions.
where w t is the nominal hourly wage in a match. Further using the Nash …rst order condition for next period and the job creation condition, allows to write it as
The wage equation is a convex combination of what the worker contributes to the match (the …rst square brackets) and what he has to give up in terms of disutility from supplying hours of work. Since workers and …rms are homogeneous and all matches adjust their wages every period, they will all choose the same wage when they are allowed to negotiate. The economy's wage bill is this wage rate times the total number of hours worked in the economy.
It is clear from the wage equation that the introduction of taxes works to decrease the worker's relative e¤ective bargaining power from to (1+st) . Consequently, economic conditions get a smaller weight in wage determination.
A.3.1 Job creation under period-by-period bargaining
The dynamics of job creation under period-by-period bargaining are characterised as follows
where E t b J t+1 can be found by …rst rewriting E t J t+1 as (not updated)
A.4 Dynamics with wage rigidity And similarly for the …rm t = P t @J t (w t ) @w t = h t (1 + s t ) + E t t;t+1 1 t+1 "w t
The dynamic contract wage equation is solved by …rst linearizing the FOC for wage setting, and then substituting the linearized worker and …rm surplus equations as well as the above discount factors in their loglinearized form (see GST (2008) Finally, as with worker surplus, the loglinear formulation of the …rm surplus can be found with the help of the above expression
The Contract wage Inserting the expressions for worker and …rm surpluses into the FOC yields (after collecting the wage terms to the left-hand side and using the Nash FOC for next period) 
where b w 0 t (r) is the target wage in the bargain, and its coe¢ cients are First, insert the target wage in the contract wage equation
Then update the average wage equation by one period and take expectations
Use this expression to eliminate E t b w t+1 from the contract wage equation 
